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Experimental Study of Component-Differentially-Challenged XOR PUFs as Security Primitives for Internet-of-Things

Khalid T. Mursi 1,2 and Yu Zhuang 1
1. Department of Computer Science, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, USA
2. College of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Jeddah, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia

Abstract—Security is critically important for Internet-of-Things, but existing cryptographic protocols are not lightweight enough for resource-constrained IoT devices. Implementable with simplistic circuits and operable with shallow power, physical unclonable functions (PUFs) leverage small but unavoidable physical variations of the circuit to produce unique responses for individual PUF instances, rendering themselves good candidates as security primitives for IoT devices. Component-differentially-challenged XOR PUFs (CDC XPUFs) are among the PUFs which were shown to be highly secure to machine learning modeling attacks. However, no study of implementation and experimentation has been carried out. In this paper, we report our implementations of CDC XPUFs on FPGAs and experimental studies of the essential properties of CDC XPUFs.

Index Terms—Resource-constrained IoT, IoT security, XOR PUF, FPGA

Cite: Khalid T. Mursi and Yu Zhuang, "Experimental Study of Component-Differentially-Challenged XOR PUFs as Security Primitives for Internet-of-Things," Journal of Communications vol. 15, no. 10, pp. 714-721, October 2020. Doi: 10.12720/jcm.15.10.714-721

Copyright © 2020 by the authors. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided that the article is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no modifications or adaptations are made.