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In-Field Attack Proof of Injected False Data in Sensor Networks

Zheng Wang1, Xiaodong Lee2, Xinchang Zhang2,3, and Baoping Yan2
1. Computer Network Information Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China; Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Scienses, Beijing, China
2. Computer Network Information Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
3. Graduate University of Chinese Academy of Scienses, Beijing, China
Abstract—In a large-scale sensor network individual sensorscan be compromised to inject bogus sensing reports. WhileSEF can filter out the outfield false reports, it is incapable ofdetecting the in-field compromised nodes, which may collectsufficient number of keyed message authentication codes(MAC). An in-field attack proof mechanism is presented inthis paper. The MAC delivery mechanism makes the MACsfollow the direction of increasing signal strength, and theskipping out mechanism helps the MACs walk out of thecompromised nodes. As the report is forwarded, each nodealong the way verifies the correctness of the MACsprobabilistically and drops those with invalid MACs. As thein-field compromised node is prevented from gatheringenough MACs, the report generated by it can be detectedand dropped en-route. Analysis and simulation show thatIAP can drop bogus reports injected by an in-fieldcompromised node in many cases.

Index Terms—Compromised nodes, in-field attack, falsedata injection, wireless sensor network.

Cite: Zheng Wang, Xiaodong Lee, Xinchang Zhang, and Baoping Yan, "In-Field Attack Proof of Injected False Data in Sensor Networks," Journal of Communications, vol. 3, no.6, pp. 35-42, 2008.

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