Abstract—In a large-scale sensor network individual sensorscan be compromised to inject bogus sensing reports. WhileSEF can filter out the outfield false reports, it is incapable ofdetecting the in-field compromised nodes, which may collectsufficient number of keyed message authentication codes(MAC). An in-field attack proof mechanism is presented inthis paper. The MAC delivery mechanism makes the MACsfollow the direction of increasing signal strength, and theskipping out mechanism helps the MACs walk out of thecompromised nodes. As the report is forwarded, each nodealong the way verifies the correctness of the MACsprobabilistically and drops those with invalid MACs. As thein-field compromised node is prevented from gatheringenough MACs, the report generated by it can be detectedand dropped en-route. Analysis and simulation show thatIAP can drop bogus reports injected by an in-fieldcompromised node in many cases.
Index Terms—Compromised nodes, in-field attack, falsedata injection, wireless sensor network.
Cite: Zheng Wang, Xiaodong Lee, Xinchang Zhang, and Baoping Yan, "In-Field Attack Proof of Injected False Data in Sensor Networks," Journal of Communications, vol. 3, no.6, pp. 35-42, 2008.
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